'The lessons of troubles, revolution, the Civil War warn of how harmful to Russia are any schisms, [they] convince [us] 
polities and market economies. New national identities have been and continue to be forged, with the shadow of the twentieth century looming large in that regard. Indeed, in countries that occupy the vast spaces of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc, and due in large measure to their extraordinarily tragic and complicated experiences of twentieth-century dictatorships, one can observe with particularly sharp resolution the principal tendencies often apparent in the politicization of national histories. These are attempts to create a 'maximally cohesive' national identity, and to manage -or attempt to discard -the guilt associated with a country's past. 2 Identities, whether individual or collective, are bound inextricably with memory. 3 In the context of national histories, commemorations of significant events have performative functions that reflect ongoing processes of constructing and affirming national identities, as well as claims to political legitimacy. Hence, major commemorations, or 'memory events,' offer us fascinating insights into the politics of history and public memory, a topic that has attained much prominence in several countries in recent years. 4 The focus of the present article is the approach of the Russian state to the challenges of commemorating the centenary of the Revolution, at a time when the state has been acting as a bulwark against revolutionary situations in Ukraine and Syria, as well as attempting to undercut the potential for upheaval at home. There has been much discussion of 1917 and its significance in Russian academia and media, and indeed in many parts of the world, during the centenary. However, within any polity, and especially one such as Russia's, the state enjoys a rather privileged position in the production of the wider public discourse on national history, through its oversight of those features of 'symbolic' politics, such as commemorations and national holidays, that are concerned specifically with historical meaning. 5 Hence, the rationale for specific studies of the 'official line' on 1917.
The central questions to be addressed here are the following: What can be learned about the mindset of Russia's ruling elite through examination of their approach to the centenary of the 'Great Russian Revolution' (as it is now usually referred to in Russia)? How does their representation of their country's past reflect the concerns and policies of the state today? And how does the Soviet past, arising from 1917, find representation in the discourse of Russia's ruling elite? We will see that the approach of the Russian state to the centenary has been based primarily on stressing the dangers and undesirability of revolution, and the importance of a strong Russian state. However, through a reading of the country's modern history based on notions of statism and an overarching historical continuity, the Revolution and the subsequent course of Soviet power can be and have been integrated into the national historical narrative. There have been imbalances, complexities, and ambiguities in how this has been done. The point, though, is that there has been ambiguity; the article argues that there is a place for the Revolution in the state's historical narrative as foundation of the Soviet system, and that subtleties and complexities are often evident in the state's approach to national history. We will also see that the state has been overtly committed to respect for the independence of the historical profession and a plurality of voices, despite its clear attempts to foster a unified (if ambivalent) historical narrative. In addition, discussions of the centenary and the Soviet past have become more politically charged in the context of the present nadir in relations since the end of the Cold War between Russia and several former Soviet neighbours, and between Russia and Western powers.
The article will begin with some brief, general comments on the revolutionary crisis a century ago, and the politics of historical commemoration, before an examination of official discourse (speech and written text produced by leading figures of state authority) on Russia's revolutionary centenary. The principal source base is transcripts and reports of speeches delivered by, roundtable discussions involving, and interviews given by members of the ruling elite, published on official websites or reported in Russian media. By the 'ruling elite,' I mean the president and government ministers, and other politicians elected or appointed to senior positions of state.
Revolution and Commemoration
Memories and identities are representations of realities that develop over time through active processes of construction. Indeed, to remember is 'to place a part of the past in the service of conceptions and needs of the present.' 6 When it comes to collective acts of remembering and thinking through the past, social consensus is rarely achieved. 7 Since 2014, and in some places before then, much of Europe and the wider world have been experiencing a series of centennial commemorations of seminal events and processes: wars, revolutions, and state formations.
Historically, of course, political revolutions have been at the root of much controversy and division within and/or between identifiable national communities. Revolutions, almost by definition, are divisive events, and scholars often identify social fragmentation accompanied by a weak or weakened state as one of their crucial determinants. 8 Intensely political and inherently unpredictable, they rarely involve consensus, and civil wars tend to follow. The resultant wounds in the body politic tend to heal with time, but revolutions of centennial vintage often retain divisive potential. In any case, the commemoration of revolution can present a distinct challenge to incumbent authorities concerned by the possibility of revolutionary stirrings, or at least social discord, within their own societies or those of their strategic allies.
A century ago, Europe was experiencing a succession of extraordinary crises. to the need for a broader geographic perspective. Socialism/communism and nationalism/racialised worldviews were the powerful revolutionary ideologies that helped ensure that subsequent decades in many parts of Europe were characterised by political extremism.
The Soviet state would prove to be the most violently destructive in modern peacetime European history. However, the Bolshevik party that began to seize power in Russia with the October Revolution was inspired by the idea of the complete liberation of Russia, and humanity in general, from the sufferings of capitalism and the horrors of imperialist warfare. Therein lies the great paradox of the October Revolution, which was by driven by ideological conviction and intended as a decisive moment of historic rupture that would alter the course of history. Reinhart
Koselleck has explained that the concept of crisis as it relates to historical time 'can mean that chain of events leading to a culminating, decisive point at which action is required.' It can also mean 'a unique and final point, after which the quality of history will be changed forever.' 11 It is precisely in both those senses that Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, the Bolshevik leader, interpreted the political situation having returned to Russia in 1917. In the course of the summer, as the authority of the Provisional Government eroded and popular support for soviet power grew, he believed that the decisive time to act had arrived. The second, socialist revolution, he believed, would spark similar revolutions in other belligerent countries, and the promise of socialism and ultimately communism would come to be realised. Putin, as president, has displayed impressive interest in and knowledge of Russian history.
Moreover, recognition of the importance of history, and more precisely a 'usable' past that stresses the positives of Russian statehood, has been characteristic of the Putin era as a means of fostering patriotic sentiment and a sense of unified national identity, a 'new national ideal.' 38 In a society as complex, variegated, and divided in socio-economic terms as Russia, history can be an especially important mechanism in that regard. 39 Indeed, Sergei Naryshkin, Russia's foreign intelligence chief and a key figure in the politics of national history as chair of the RIO, remarked in July 2017
that it is impossible to overestimate the importance of history as an object of study for the 'upbringing' (vospitanie) of patriotic Russian citizens not easy to 'manipulate.' In particular, Naryshkin singled out the importance of understanding Russian statehood (gosudarstvennost') as an integral part of 'great Russian culture' (see below).
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With that perspective, the ruling political elite and pro-state cultural elite have more to work with when it comes to the Stalin era, the era of military glory and superpower status, than with the more controversial and divisive revolutionary era. During the Putin years, memory of victory in the Great Patriotic War has become the key, even sacred, element of the symbolic infrastructure of patriotic national identity. 41 By contrast, the October Revolution can be seen to represent a misguided and reckless attempt to alter fundamentally the course of Russian history, and to undermine the strength and unity of the Russian state (largely within its imperial configuration).
In early 2016, Putin caused controversy when he criticised Lenin for placing 'an atomic bomb'
under the edifice of the Russian state by supporting a policy of national autonomy with right of secession within the structure of the USSR. 42 Historian Ol'ga Vasil'eva, Minister of Education, succinctly explained this differentiated understanding of the Leninist and Stalinist eras in an interview in November 2016. With the October Revolution, she explained, the Bolsheviks 'broke off continuity with pre-revolutionary history.' From the 1930s, however, Stalin restored a sense of historical continuity, tapping into Russian patriotism as a tool for popular mobilization. 43 To avoid misrepresenting Vasil'eva's views on Stalin, she then stressed in the interview that Stalin had been a 'tyrant.'
Some commentators in Russian-language media have labelled the approach of the ruling elite to the centenary 'undefined and schizophrenic,' or at least 'incoherent,' a result of the state's selective and unbalanced approach to the Soviet past. 44 The October Revolution presents a The politics of commemoration, however, are readily apparent in elite political discourse.
Central to this has been the motif of an essential continuity in Russian history that survived the Revolution. Naryshkin, for example, has described Russia's history as 'integral and continuous.' 
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Of course, the rhetoric of a 'single logic' and 'social consensus' in representations of national history sits uneasily with commitment to respect for multiple interpretations of the past. Similar dissonance has been evident in Putin's pronouncements on historical matters for at least a decade.
As Mark Edele has observed, Putin, with his inclination towards a positivist understanding of the past, does not appear to perceive 'the contradiction between the ideological function of history and the insistence that a plurality of views should be expressed.' 61 However, to reiterate, the state's approach to the centenary has recognised the legitimacy of diverse appraisals, despite -or alongside -the discourse of 'social consensus.' On the actual centenary of the October Revolution, The chair of the Council, the writer Iurii Poliakov, described the film in terms of 'ideological struggle with our country.' 85 Criticisms of the film demonstrate that Russian cultural and political elites have appropriated the vogueish language of 'information warfare' between the West and Russia reminiscent of the Cold War, but they also suggest the depth to which elements of the Soviet past are bound with projections of Russian identity in the present. Screenings of The Death of Stalin would diverge from the tendency in Putin-era Russian cinema to utilise the genre of historical film to reflect a patriotic image of the country and its citizens. 86 Nonetheless, Putin has explicitly stated that it would be impermissible to 'ban anything' such as a film or publication unless it were actually criminal in nature.
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The Soviet past and political repression Nonetheless, it is clear that the ruling political elite would rather focus on a more triumphant narrative of the country's past, one that posits national overcoming of past traumas.
In his annual speech to the Federal Assembly in December 2016, Putin addressed the imminent centenary and stated plainly that the lessons of national history are needed 'for reconciliation, for strengthening the social, political, civic consensus that we have today achieved.' 'We are one people,' he noted, 'and we have one Russia.' Hence, he continued, it is 'impermissible to drag along the splits, rancour, resentments and bitterness of the past in our present-day lives.' To defy this would be, as he put it, to 'speculate' for particular political or other reasons 'on the tragedies that affected practically every family in Russia, regardless of which the side of the barricades their forebears were.'
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Putin's statement could be read as a reference to the long history of political repression in the Soviet Union, and not just to the divisions of the Civil War that were his ostensible focus. Rather more unambiguously, Putin concluded his address at the opening of the 'Wall of Sorrow' with the message that it would be impermissible to agitate for a settling of old accounts (in relation to the violence of the Soviet state). Nothing or nobody should 'push' society towards confrontation on that basis. 93 The implication seems to be that it is time to draw a line under the sorrow and mourning of the past and to move on, to affix its place in national history as something to be condemned, but not to encourage further deep excavation. 94 The present nadir in relations with Western powers suggests that this attitude is unlikely to change soon, as the state will seek to reinforce patriotic pride in the positive achievements of the Soviet regime. It is within this ideological context that one can understand the tense relationship between the state and Memorial, the internationally-renowned human rights organisation that has for almost thirty years been at the forefront of attempts to memorialise the victims and research the processes of Soviet repressions.
Memorial has been accused by Kremlin supporters of proffering a type of memory politics that occasioned a 'crisis' of national identity in the early 1990s, through comparison of Stalinism and fascism. 95 Most recently, Memorial has been embroiled in legal charges of having violated the 2012 law on foreign agents. 96 Indeed, Memorial's struggles might serve to illustrate the potentially admonitory implications of the official search for 'reconciliation' and 'consensus.'
Concluding thoughts
The centenary of the Russian Revolution has provided a fascinating opportunity to observe the politics of history in contemporary Russia, to understand the complex portrayals of the Soviet past in projections of contemporary Russian national identity, and to enhance awareness of the controversies of historical representation in post-Soviet and post-socialist spaces. Russia's ruling elite have adopted a low-key approach to the centenary. This is a consequence of their ideological hostility toward revolution, as well as the unavoidable public attention during the centenary on the fate of the authoritarian tsarist regime, and the revolutionary ideals that animated those historic events and processes. The state has no desire to concentrate that attention even more. Yet, the centenary is too significant to be ignored, and this article has suggested that it does in fact have a place in the state's preferred national historical narrative. The message of the ruling elite has been that the current administration is the legitimate heir to and guarantor of the historic role and even destiny of Russia as a strong, integral political power, a message that is especially important at a time of deteriorating relations with Western powers. Their message has also been that the continued security of the state is not guaranteed, and that forces from without or within must be prevented from undermining it. Indeed, as Il'ia Kalinin has perceptively observed, the official state discourse of historical 'reconciliation' and 'social consensus' undoubtedly serves 'to smear any oppositional activity as synonymous with the cataclysmic image of revolution.' 
